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Ballot initiative #3

Verifiable nuclear arms freeze
Dr. Mark Edehnan,
public policy economist, SDSU

The third ballot initiative to
be decided by Sou th Dakota
voters in the November election
is a resolution to determine
support or opposition for a
verifiable nuclear arms freeze
between the United States and
the Soviet Union.
A ''yes'' vote on this ballot
initiative registers support from
South Dakota for a verifiable
nuclear arms freeze between
the United States and the Soviet
Union. A "no" vote signifies
opposition to registering support
from Sou th Dakota for a
l verifiable nuclear arms freeze.

place any more nuclear
warheads; missiles, planes,
submarines, or any other
launchers designed to fire
nuclear warheads;
B. that the United States
faithfully observe this
agreement after it is signed, and
that the United States closely
monitor the Soviet Union to
insure that it, too, is faithfully
observing this agreement;
C. and that the United States
and the Soviet Union should
then begin to reduce the number
of their nuclear weapons in an
orderly and balanced way, and
to involve other nuclear nations
in such reductions.

Specific provisions
of the initiative

What does this
initiative do?

The verifiable nuclear freeze
resolution contains a preamble
and three sections:
AN ACT to require the Governor
to notify the federal
government that the people of
South Dakota mandate a
verifiable nuclear arms
freeze.

The initiative says "the people
of Sou th Dakota mandate a
verifiable nuclear arms freeze.''
The term ''mandate'' often
means to command or to order
that something be done.
However, in this case
''mandate'' means to report
voter preferences only.
The United States Constitution
states that it is the power and
responsibility of the Congress
and the President to provide for
the common defense of the
people. As a result, governments
and voters from individual
states have no authority or legal
power to resolve the nuclear
arms dilemma. The only power
available to voters is the ability
to publicly register sentiment
and/or elect political leaders
who may be able to solve the
dilemma.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF
THE ST ATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA:

That prior to January 15,
1985, the Governor of South
Dakota shall inform the
President of the United States
and the members of the South
Dakota Congressional Delegation
that the people of South Dakota
mandate the following:
A. that the United States
enter into an agreement with
the Soviet Union that neither
country will build, test, or put in

If passed, this proposal would
require the Governor to inform
the President and our South
Dakota Congressional Delegation
of the vote and the provisions of
the initiative before January 15,
1985. If defeated, no action
would be required.
However, in either case, the
results will be reported by the
media. The Congressional
delegation and the White House
will likely be aware of the
initiative results as soon as they
are tallied and reported.
While passage of the
amendment will not legally tie
the hands of Congress or the
President, if a number of states
overwhelmingly pass or defeat
similar resolutions, defense and
budgetary votes in Congress
may be affected and/or the
President may be persuaded to
adjust or reaffirm the nuclear
arms negotiation strategy of our
nation.

Are other states voting
on nuclear arms freeze?
Presently, South Dakota is the
only state that will vote on a
nuclear freeze resolution this
coming November 6th.
In November 198 2, there were
9 states, the District of
Columbia, and 29 cities and
counties with nuclear freeze
resolutions on their ballots. The
proposals passed in 8 states,
Washington D.C., and in 27
cities and counties. The
approving states included North
Dakota, Montana, California,
Oregon, New Jersey,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island,

and Michigan. The measures
were defeated in Arizona and
two counties. An additional
state, Wisconsin, approved the
referendum prior to the general
election.

What is verification?
There is disagreement among
the analysts on what
"adequate" verification means.
Some suggest that the size of
modern nuclear missiles is such
that they may be easily
disguised and hidden from
satellites. If so, perhaps on-site
inspection and selected off-site
inspection by a neutral party is
required.
Others suggest that a
combination of satellite
inspection and intelligence
sources is adequate for
verification.
Verification procedures are
not defined in the ballot
measure. Voting yes or no in
November may depend on
individual beliefs about what
'' a de qua te'' verification is and
whether it will exist.

Is nuclear parity
a valid issue?
The U.S. can negotiate from
(1) a position of nuclear
superiority, (2) nuclear parity,
or (3) nuclear inferiority. Voting
yes or no on this initiative may
depend upon individual beliefs
about where the U.S. is now and
where we ought to be when we
enter a nuclear freeze.
In addition, there are those
who believe that nuclear parity
is irrelevant. They argue that
the consequences of the East
and West being able to
annihilate the world 10 times
over is the same as 40 times
over and that more weapons
only increase the chances that
they will be used.

Voter access to strategical
information is limited

citizens, and enhancement of
global security and stability.

While South Dakota voters
may be able to study our
defense system and assess the
strategy of our leaders, we have
only limited access to
intelligence data on defense
capabilities and the strategy of
the Soviet Union. As a result,
some have debated whether or
not the voters in general have
"adequate" information to
appraise the nuclear freeze
issue.

What are the priority missions?

In the final analysis, some
people believe that a nuclear
arms freeze agreement can be
successful and that an attempt
to negotiate should be made. In
contrast, others believe that an
agreement can not be
successfully implemented or that
negotiations should not be made
at the present time. There are
risks associated with both
options.
Whether Ballot Initiative 3
contributes to or hinders the
nuclear arms negotiation
process is a value judgment that
South Dakota voters will make
on November 6th.

Additional defense
and military facts
A basic understanding of our
defense resources and military
facts is helpful in making
informed conclusions and voter
decisions on the nuclear freeze
issue.
Why do we have a military?
Four fundamental reasons for
a military include preservation
of U.S. sovereignty, protection of
the life and liberty of U.S.
citizens, protection of the
'!general welfare" of U.S.

The priorities of our military
are enumerated in various
government documents. These
include defense of the homeland,
defense of our allies (NATO,
Japan, Australia, New Zealand,
South Korea, and other selected
Pacific and Asian neighbors),
defense of our access to
resources (Mideast and Africa),
and extension of deterrence
against communism (Central and
South America).
With present concerns over
the size of federal budget
deficits, both major political
parties have been looking for
ways to reduce defense
expenditures. The President's
Grace Commission recently
recommended defense
management moves that would
save nearly $100 billion over 3
years. These recommendations
included standardizing
replacement parts, streamlining
procurement processes, shifting
to multi-year contracts, having
private opera tors operate
commissaries, and closing some
military bases.
In addition, the development
of any new weapons system
commits the government to longterm expenditures. The
development of B-1 bombers,
land-based missile systems, and
space defense can require 10 to
20 years. Some technologies may
·become obsolete or not practical
in combat trials even before
they can be widely adopted.
The budget questions center
around the following: How much
nuclear defense spending
provides for "adequate
defense"? Are our allies paying
their fair share? Should current
taxpayers pay for current
defense expenditures or should

How much do we spend on
defense?

Actual dollars
(bil.)
Percent of the
federal budget (% )
Percent of Gross
National Product( % )

1945

1955

1965

1975

1984

82

40

50

86

237e

86

59

42

26

28e

39

10

7.2

5.5

weapons (B-52s and B-ls).
Strategic forces account for
10 % of the defense budget.
Support Services include
intelligence and communication,
research and development,
general supply and procurement
activities, training and medical
services, and management of
resources not allocated to the
conventional or strategic forces.
Support services account for
44 % of the defense budget.

6.7e

e = prelimina ry estima te
Source: Va ri ous U.S. budgets and histo rical statisti cs

future taxpayers pay for
current defense expenditures
through deficit spending? The
answers involve value judgments
made by Congress and the
President.
How is the defense
budget allocated?
The Conventional Forces are
designed to deter, defend, and
retaliate against attacks by
)utilizing mostly manpower and
conventional weapons. The
conventional forces include
ground, air, naval, rapid
deployment, and reserve forces.

Some tactical intermediaterange nuclear weapons are also
included in this function. The
conventional forces account for
46% of the defense budget.
Strategic Forces are designed
to deter, def end, and retaliate
against a nuc~ear attack.
Included are offensive weapons
in the "nuclear triad," nuclear
defense weapons systems, and
the command control. The triad
includes (1) land-based InterContinental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBMs), (2) ocean-based
Submarine Launched Ballistic
Missiles (SLBMs ), and (3) airbased bombers with nuclear

How do we compare
with the USSR?
Estimated
1982 status

Popula tion
(mil)
Military spending
(bil)
% of GNP
(% )
Strategical nuclear
warheads
All nuclear warheads
Military
manpower
(mil)
Attack submarines
Major warships
Camba t aircraft
Tanks and
heavy artillery

NATO

U.S.

626
287
4.8

232
176
5.9

Warsaw
Pact

USSR

380
211

272
191
11.9

10.6

9,975
30,000

7,226
20,000

5.8
232
428
12,000

2.1
95
206
7,200

4.8
298
296
12 ,000

4 .3
273
290
6,300

46,000

18,500

87,000

70,000

Note that numbers do no t por tray technical obsolescence or differences in cha racteri sti cs of the
various nuclea r wa rh eads. From va rious defen se sources as compiled and published by the League of
Women Voters in " Dolla rs fo r defense." 1983. Co rr abora ted by addi tional media sou rces.
The degr ee of confidence in the Soviet block estima tes is und erstandably less than for NATO a nd
th e U.S. , howeve r, the estimates a re based on th e bes t ava ila ble in form a tion.

Are there vulnerabilities in
our strategic defense?
Presently, 50% of our nuclear
warheads are based on
submarines, 28 % are on
bombers , and 22 % are landbased missiles.
Defense analysts suggest that
the submarines are the most
survivable and least vulnerable
to Soviet attack. However, there
are more command
communication control problems
with coordination of submarine
attacks.
Improved USSR defense has
increased the risk that bombers
would be destroyed before they
reach their targets. So, airbased technology development
has concentrated on attaching
cruise missiles to bombers and
on stealth bombers that can
" hide" from radar.
The League of Women Voters
and other media sources
indicate that most analysts
believe that USSR multiplewar head technology makes the
U.S. land-based ICBMs
vulnerable. Recently, some
analysts have suggested that
90% of our land-based ICBMs
would likely be wiped out before
we could retaliate to a first
strike by the USSR.
The administration has
contended that the land-based
ICBMs are necessary to keep
the USSR from focusing on the

other two legs of our nuclear
triad-air and sea based
missiles. Therefore,
improvement is needed to
reduce the vulnerability of the
land-based ICBMs to a first
strike.
Several proposals have
included hardening the present
missile silos, moving the missiles
among various sites, building
missile silos in a dense pack,
and a space defense system.
Critics claim that the
remaining 80 % of our missiles

in the triad are a sufficient
deterrent. They claim that the
land-based missile system
improvement proposals are too
costly and that the system would
still be vulnerable after
improvement.
In the final analysis, the
decisions by Sou th Dakota
voters on whether the timing is
right for a nuclear freeze may
be influenced by our
understanding of (1) the costs
and vulnerabilities of our

present nuclear defense system,
the present proposals on
"improving" our nuclear
defense, and (3) the beliefs
about how we compare to the
Soviet military.
(2)

Issued in furtherance ot Cooperat ive Extens ion work ,
Acts ot May 8 and June 30, 1914, in cooperation with
the USDA, Delwyn Dearborn , Acting Director ot CES,
SDSU , Brookings . Educational programs and
materials ottered w 'thout regard to age, race, color,
religion , sex, handicap or national origin . An Equal Op portunity Employer.
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